Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore the impact of the poverty alleviation program launched by the Argentine government to cope with the deleterious effects of the 2002 crisis on various types of crime. Additionally, it embeds the findings for the Argentine case within the broader empirical debate regarding the effect of welfare programs on delinquency.
Few years ago the copious literature on crime seemed to have arrived at a consensus on the influence of relief spending programs on crime. The evidence from various U.S. data sets fitted the theoretical argument, rooted in Becker (1968) seminal contribution that transfers to the needed individuals increase the opportunity cost of committing crime (Defronzo, 1983 and 1996; Zhang, 1997; Chamlin et al., 2002) . Nonetheless, Worral (2005) has challenged that view presenting empirical evidence and theoretical arguments for little or no connection between serious crime and poverty relief spending 1 . He argues that the resulting negative correlation between crime and economic assistance obtained in several empirical studies comes mainly from cross-sectional data, and therefore not controlling for fluctuations of the dependent variable over time. Further, he claims that a small amount of welfare transfer is unlikely to change individual attitudes towards crime. This is a key point.
Relief transfers might help divert individuals "specialized" in minor offenses like larceny, petty theft or shoplifting from illegal to legal activities, because the investment necessary to participate in those activities is very small, but might not be enough to dissuade offenders dedicated to more sophisticated crimes like robbery and auto theft that require higher degree of investment in both, human capital and inputs.
Recent evidence from U.S. and international panel data by Johnson et al. (2007) and Savage et al. (2009) 
Economic conditions, Criminal Activity and Welfare Spending
For analytical purposes, the relationship between criminal activity and welfare spending can be split in two separate (but closely related) links. On one hand, there is a connection between economic conditions and crime that has been extensively studied, in particular the unemployment-crime link (Paternoster and Bushway, 2001; Kleck and Chiricos, 2002; Yearwood and Koinis, 2009; Arvanites and Defina, 2006) and the inequality and crime association (Kelly, 2000; Brush, 2007; Choe, 2008; Scorzafave and Soares, 2009). Following Becker (1968) , an individual engages in an illicit activity only if its expected net value is higher than the expected gain from a legal activity. Hence, any deterioration in the labor market that changes the return of legal vis a vis illegal activities, like job loss, wage cuts or reduction in extra hours, is expected to augment the crime rate. Nonetheless, this effect may be offset by shrinking crime opportunities in a declining economy. As explained by Cantor and Land (1985) , there are two opposite forces at work over the business cycle: motivation and opportunity. Recessions increase motivation to commit crime but may be counteracted by diminishing opportunities as the economy gets poorer 2 . The opposite occurs in recoveries. Opportunities increase pari passu with the widespread availability of goods and profitable illegal activities but can be counterbalanced by diminishing motivation.
2 An economy undergoing a crisis usually shows high levels of strain, weak social control and high rates of unemployment and underemployment, which reduces the opportunity cost of offenses. Social control is described as the ability of society to regulate its members through formal and informal norms. See Arvanites and Defina (2006) On the other hand, there is a connection between welfare spending and crime that has received much less attention in the literature. The main argument is that welfare payments to disadvantaged individuals change their time allocation between legal and illegal activities favoring the former in detriment of the latter. Zhang (1997) In another provocative paper, Burek (2006) 
Crisis, Social Distress and Crime in Argentina
Argentina is constitutionally organized as a federal republic with 23 provinces and an autonomous federal district, the city of Buenos Aires. In 2002 Argentina suffered the deepest crisis in its history. The ten-year old currency board that had been established by law in the early 1990s to stabilize the economy and promote growth, collapsed following devaluation, massive capital outflows and the world largest debt 5 According to Burke (2006) instrumental crimes yield monetary or material gain rather than emotional satisfaction. Conversely, expressive crimes are committed to resolve issues of anger, the desire for control, frustration, and/ or despair. Crimes such as homicide, aggravated assaults, and rapes are considered to be expressive in nature.
default ever. GDP plunged 11% and consumer price inflation escalated to 26%. The contraction of the economic activity reduced labor demand, particularly the demand for unskilled workers. The unemployment and underemployment rates peaked 20%
and 12% respectively in the first half of 2003. More than 50% of the population fell below the poverty line and almost a third of the total urban population starved. The poor had limited or no access to credit markets and lacked assets to hedge against employment shocks and the inflation tax that deteriorated their wealth and income.
Moreover, the rapid currency depreciation increased the price of tradable relative to non-tradable goods, hurting the poor via fall in real wages. Middle income population also suffered since bank deposits denominated in U.S. dollars were partially confiscated by the government. Massive protests and rallies of unemployed and depositors contributed to social unrest. Table 1 presents the behavior of some key socioeconomic variables at the of peak the crisis The extreme socioeconomic circumstances impelled the federal government to 
Econometric Specification and Data
In order to study the conjectured connection between welfare spending and criminal 
(I)
Where i indexes jurisdictions and t represents time (half years)
Dependent variables
I test the impact of poverty relief program on seven variables measuring criminal activity: total crime rate, property crime, robbery, larceny, crime against persons, aggravated assault and homicide. Property crimes represented 65% of total offenses in the period under study and its two main categories, robbery and larceny, accounted for 32% and 27% of total crime respectively. Likewise, crime against persons explained 18% of total crime and the share of aggravated assault and homicide were 11% and 0.2% correspondingly.
Key Independent Variable
The independent variable of primary interest in my analysis is RELIEF, defined as the monthly average of number of beneficiary of the Unemployed-Headed Household Program per 1000 inhabitants in a given district and semester.
Controlling socioeconomic influences
My empirical study includes a series of socioeconomic control variables which have been found in the extant literature to explain the behavior of different categories of crime rate. I include the unemployment rate to capture the effect of the implicit price of legal relative to illegal activities. In Cantor and Land (1985) language, the increase in unemployment rate augments the motivation for crime, particularly property crimes.
To account for additional influences of weak labor market, I construct another variable that adds the rate of underemployment to the rate of unemployment.
Following the abundant literature on crime determinants I include the Gini coefficient to reflect the impact of income distribution on crime. I assume that the greater the baseline level of Gini Coefficient in the province, the higher the criminal activity.
Alternative measures of income inequality like the Theil and Entropia indices were also considered.
I incorporate the collection of turnover tax per capita as a proxy for economic activity.
The usual variable to capture the opportunity effect on crime is GDP per capita but it is only available on annual basis. The turnover tax is a provincial duty applied to sales in every stage of production. On average, turnover tax accounted for 60% of local tax collection in the period 2002-2006. I expect improving economic conditions to increase the income of legal activities relative to the illegal ones and therefore to be negatively correlated to crime rates, particularly property crimes. In addition to the socioeconomic control variables discussed above I also include Population Density to account for the fact that crime is higher in highly populated areas. Table 3 Regressions (1), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9) and (11) display the estimations of the full model for each independent crime variable while regression (2), (4), (8), (10) and (12) only contain control variables that pass the .10 level of significance, so they are the ones upon which I base my conclusions. Notice that regressions (5) and (6) having Robbery and Larceny as dependent variables present all explanatory variables at usual levels of significance. Savage et al. (2008) in their cross country analysis.
Regression results
As expected, the impact of poverty-alleviation aid on crime against person is very low and null on homicide. The value estimated for the elasticity of Aggravated Assault, close to the value of Robbery, may indicate that a substantial number of such type of offense is related to property crimes.
9 Federal government did not use crime rate to evaluate the need of relief spending (actually, they were guided by the percentage of population under the poverty line) so there is no simultaneity issue that could bias the RELIEF coefficient. 10 The Arellano-Bond estimation method is generally used when N is large (here the number of provinces) and T (time periods) is small. My data set has N= 23 and T= 8. See Tables 2A and 3A in the Appendix, 
Concluding remarks
In the last decade there have been an interesting discussion regarding the effects of welfare spending on crime which has obvious public policy implications. The extant literature has focused mainly on empirical issues using data sets from various U.S.
states in different periods. The international evidence has been scarce on this topic. Property Crime offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i. Property crimes include robberies, larcenies and other property crimes
Robbery it
Taking or attempting to take anything of value from a person by force or threat of force or violence per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i. Attempted robberies are included. Robberies aggravated by injuries or death are excluded
Larceny it
Unlawfully taking property from another without force, violence or fraud (attempted larcenies are included) per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i. Attempted larcenies are included
Persons it
Crime against persons per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i.
Assault it
Aggravated assaults per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i.
Homicide it
Homicide offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i
Key independent variable

Relief it
Number of beneficiaries of Unemployed-Headed Household Program (Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados) per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i. (Monthly Average)
Control Variables
Activity it
Turnover tax collection per capita in district i at semester t (in constant pesos of 2004)
Unemployment it
Rate of unemployment of district i in semester t.
Gini it
Gini coefficient of district i in semester t.
Density it
Population per square kilometers of district i at semester t.
Note: Robbery and Larceny are included in the property crime category. Aggravated assault and homicide are included in the category Crime against Persons. 
